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I agree with just about everything Jonathan Macey (2017) says in his
symposium contribution. His claim that bureaucratic tendencies toward regularity—speciﬁcally, treating like cases alike—generate errors in categorization seems appropriate to me. His explanations of
the pathologies in ﬁnancial regulation should fall in the category of essential or required reading for anyone who chooses to write on the
topic. Where I differ from Macey is in the choice of framework, or perspective from which to view the pathologies. Whereas Macey adopts
an “error cost” framework, which is clearly appropriate for this symposium, I would build explicitly on a “public choice” framework.1
Margaret Thatcher famously said that “Europe was created by history. America was created by philosophy.” One could unpack Thatcher’s statement further by saying that Europe was created by accidents,
catastrophes, and wars, whereas America, and particularly the American Constitution, developed at least in outline form from a wellconsidered design (see, e.g., The Federalist Papers).2
* William Fairﬁeld Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor
of Law, Boston University School of Law. I thank Jack Beermann for helpful comments.
1
Public choice can be described as the application of economics to political science. I
refer generally to the theory that government actors engage in self-interested, utilitymaximizing behavior. On public choice theory, see Mueller (1989) and Niskanen
(1971). Although I distinguish the error-cost model adopted by Macey from the public
choice model, the two models are by no means mutually exclusive. Moreover, Macey
has contributed substantially to the public choice literature himself (see, e.g., Macey
1988). For a critique of Macey’s public choice arguments, see Beermann (1991).
2
Obviously, one could quibble that the US Constitution itself is the result of history (wars, catastrophes, accidents, trial and error). But even a casual reader of a foundElectronically published: December 6, 2018
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One can offer a similar division in explaining a particular regulatory framework: it is either a creation of history or of philosophy—
or some mixture of both. Macey’s thesis that bureaucratic tendencies
toward order generate regulatory pathologies suggests a vision of bureaucrats who at least try to play the role of philosophers or “intelligent designers” of regulation. I would start with a very different view
of regulatory bureaucrats.
I believe history carries much more weight than philosophy in accounting for the shape of most regulatory frameworks in ﬁnance. Financial regulation responds to accidents and catastrophes—such as
the Great Recession of 2008. In the wake of these accidents, legislatures respond with new regulations, and factions consisting largely
of incumbent pressure groups move in with versions of reform suitable to their interests. The result is a legislative “solution” that often
fails to resolve the pathologies that caused the catastrophes because
so many compromises and carve-outs have had to be included to satisfy the incumbent factions. The most powerful interest groups typically do not lose their advantages over rivals at the end of the reform
process and often emerge from the ashes of reform with even greater
competitive advantages. The groups that received the largest subsidies from the state before the catastrophe continue to receive their
subsidies after the reform.
Increasingly, the statutes that emerge from regulatory reform introduce a new regulatory infrastructure as well. The statutes generate
new rules that ﬁrms must follow to gain regulatory approval or to
avoid punishment. In the wake of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), banks have had to hire
numerous employees (private bureaucrats) to help them ﬁgure out
how to comply with the many rules embedded in the statute. Modern
reform statutes increasingly generate agencies that must be staffed by
government bureaucrats and that are charged with producing more
rules. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created
by Dodd-Frank, now employs nearly 2,000 people, and the agency worked
diligently, until the change in administration in 2017, to develop new
rules to regulate lenders. These agencies are overseen ultimately by
courts, but they often work initially to create a barrier between the regulated parties and the courts.
Stepping a bit further into generality, in the wake of ﬁnancial catastrophes, reform legislation sets initial conditions for new law that will
regulate the ﬁnance industry. This new law often will be a “negotiated
product” resulting from deals made among legislators and incumbent
ing document such as The Federalist Papers would be astounded by the depth of analysis—of economics, of history, of alternative institutions—reﬂected in the work.
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factions (large ﬁrms, regulatory pressure groups). From these initial
conditions, bureaucratic action can either exacerbate the inefﬁciencies built into the initial bargain or mitigate the inefﬁciencies. Whether
bureaucratic actions will mitigate or exacerbate the inefﬁciencies depends, in turn, on other factors: whether the sitting administration is
committed to addressing the inefﬁciencies (although very often the administration will introduce new inefﬁciencies or biases) and the extent
to which the courts oversee the regulatory regime. As a general rule,
where courts play a strong and direct role in administering the statute,
such as the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act), the inefﬁciencies in the initial design tend to be mitigated through court review.3 Conversely, where courts are somewhat removed from administration because of the existence of an administrative agency burdened
with enforcing an enormous regulatory statute (e.g., health-care regulation), there is a greater likelihood that bureaucratic action will exacerbate inefﬁciencies built into the framework from the start.
I just offered the Sherman Act as an example because it is a regulatory statute with such a thin set of rules at its base that courts have
been left to administer the statute with virtually no direct administrative or bureaucratic input by executive-branch agents. The executivebranch agents who help to administer the Sherman Act do so only as
enforcers—that is, essentially as plaintiffs who come to court and attempt to persuade the court to apply or to change the law in order to
advantage the enforcer. Sherman Act enforcers, however, play no direct role in the creation or interpretation of the law. The result has
been a consistent move toward relatively simple and discretionary
rules that have tended to be efﬁcient. The general trend of antitrust
law has been away from per se prohibitions and toward “rule of reason” tests that enable courts to consider the efﬁciency of a particular
practice before deciding whether it should be declared unlawful under
the statute.
Macey’s contribution addresses regulation within an administrative
or bureaucratic framework—in contrast to the courts. This is an appropriate focus, in this case, because it is consistent with the nature of ﬁnancial regulation. Unlike the Sherman Act example, the statutes
Macey examines are mostly elaborated and developed through direct
bureaucratic involvement. Agency ofﬁcials working on ﬁnancial regulation generally develop and explicate statutory provisions—the most
famous example of which is the Volcker rule, which involves hundreds
of pages of bureaucratic law development.

3
For an elaboration of this claim about the relationship between statute and common law, though in the context of federal labor law, see Hylton (1993, 1996).
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Within the agency framework Macey studies, we observe the errors
he describes and correctly attributes to bureaucratic action. The tendency toward regularity—of treating like cases alike—I would attribute to the possibility and risk of court review rather than a general
tendency or desire for order among bureaucrats. I think bureaucrats
seek orderly explanations for their actions because those actions eventually will be exposed to judicial scrutiny. If those actions were never
to be exposed to judicial scrutiny, the bureaucrats would care a lot less
about generating the appearance of order. The other tendency Macey
attributes to bureaucrats, which is to avoid the costs of erroneous regulatory inaction, reﬂects the asymmetric political costs of action and
inaction. Erroneous action can always be defended ex post, often by referring to the horrible events that might have resulted without action.
Erroneous inaction, however, always leaves the bureaucrat exposed to
charges that he failed to act appropriately and in time.4 Such charges
are often politically motivated.
Macey offers several examples to support his thesis of bureaucratic
error. One is the “systemically important ﬁnancial institution” (SIFI)
status categorization for ﬁrms administered by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), an agency created by Dodd-Frank.
The SIFI categorization has been imposed on ﬁrms too aggressively,
Macey argues, inappropriately burdening some ﬁrms with the status
(e.g., MetLife). Although I agree with Macey’s description of the process as prone to error, I am equally impressed by the competitive effects
of the FSOC’s actions. The SIFI designation imposes costly regulatory
obligations that clearly favor the largest ﬁrms within the industry.
Firms directly below achieving SIFI status have no incentive to expand
into the status. Firms with the status have incentives to increase in
scale, because by increasing they can reduce the unit cost of regulation.
The same pattern holds for Dodd-Frank generally. The regulatory
costs of the statute have advantaged larger banks, because they can
spread the ﬁxed costs of regulatory compliance over a much larger
revenue base. At the same time, the regulatory costs have pushed a
substantial share of the smaller, community-oriented banks out of
business (or into forced consolidations) and throttled the entry of
new community banks.
The Community Reinvestment Act shows the same pattern (see
Macey and Miller 1993; Hylton and Rougeau 1996). The statute aims
4
It is important, in this argument, that the bureaucrat’s actions are publicly observable and monitored by hostile political factions. If the bureaucrat’s actions were
not observable, then inaction would be an attractive option because it would allow
the bureaucrat to enjoy a more leisurely work environment. When, for example, public enforcement agents are not consistently monitored, the problem of motivating
them to enforce the law becomes a central concern (see Becker and Stigler 1974).
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to promote investment in economically decaying inner cities. Large
banks have found it relatively easy to comply compared with their
smaller rivals. The interesting feature here is that the smaller rivals
most burdened by the statute often consist of minority-owned banks
that entered the industry with the aim to serve businesses in the predominantly minority communities of inner cities.
Sometimes regulatory errors are apparent, but they remain in place
because the cost of correction for large incumbents is too high. For this,
probably the best illustration is the work of credit rating agencies with
respect to mortgage-backed securities. One of the questions generated
by the 2008 banking crisis is why the credit rating agencies moved
in parallel fashion by awarding high credit ratings to mortgage-backed
securities long after evidence emerged suggesting that a downgrade would
be appropriate (for an insightful discussion, see Hill [2010]). One obvious possible explanation is that the credit rating agencies did not really
compete against each other, suggesting that the high credit ratings given
to mortgage-backed securities resulted from tacit collusion. However,
as Macey makes clear, large banks had “herded” into these securities
because of the erroneously high credit ratings. The result was an equilibrium in which banks and credit rating agencies joined in a rational
disbelief of bad news. Too much was at stake for the credit rating agencies to rationally update their assessments and consequently downgrade the securities.
The general pattern is simple: large banks manage the statutory reform process so that it produces a regulatory framework that advantages them relative to their smaller rivals. The result is that the banking industry moves toward greater concentration, increasing the degree
of ﬁnancial risk. Substantial subsidies, such as the one provided by federal deposit insurance (coupled with inefﬁcient pricing of the insurance), remain in place despite numerous rounds of reform.
In sum, I am in full agreement with Macey on the processes and
tendencies of bureaucratic error. However, I would identify the source
of those tendencies within incentives created, often deliberately, by
participants in the statutory reform process.
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